Short bio:

I am an associate professor of philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, in the Section of Philosophy of Language and Mind.
I defended my Ph.D. thesis about rule-following and semantic nonfactualism in 2010 under the supervision of Jerzy Szymura. I started working as a full-time faculty member in the Department at Philosophy of Jagiellonian University in 2013. My main research interests from that moment have focused on foundational issues in philosophy of language and metaphysics of mind (especially the status of propositional attitudes). Currently, I am also working on social ontology, especially on the group-mind hypothesis. From 2018 I have been a member of Jagiellonian Centre for Law, Language and Philosophy. I obtained my ‘habilitation’ degree in 2022.

Research interests:

• Social ontology: group minds, institutional entities, social kinds;
• Philosophy of mind: propositional attitudes, realism in philosophy of mind, status of folk psychology;
• Philosophy of language: metasemantics, normativitiy of meaning.
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Papers in English:

1. The meta-metaphysics of group beliefs: in search of alternatives. Synthese 201, 113 (2023). (download)
2. Folk Psychological Models and the Metaphysics of Belief. A Reply to Curry. (forthcoming) in Philosophia (download)
3. Expressivism and the ex aequo et bono adjudication method. (with Izabela Skoczeń). forthcoming in T. Gizbert-Studnicki, F. Poggi, I. Skoczeń (Eds.) "Interpretivism and the Limits of Law" (Edward Elgar, 2022). (preprint)
4. How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs.  Review of Philosophy and Psychology. (2022) 13(1), 85-107.  (download)
5. Expressivism, inferentialism, and the status of attitudes (forthcoming) in Inquiry (link) (Free Accepted Manuscript version here)
6. The Lycan–Stich Argument and the Plasticity of “Belief". Erkenntnis (2022) 87,1257–1273  (download)
7. Can Deflationism Save Interpretivism? Philosophia (2020) 48:709–725 (link) (free full-text view-only version here)
8. Eliminativism: the Problem of Representation and Carnapian Metametaphysics, Acta Analytica, (2019) 34(2), 181-195.(download)
9. Inferentialism without Normativity (with Paweł Grabarczyk), Organon F 25 (2) 2018: 174-195 (dowlnoad)
10. Semantic Deflationism, Public Language Meaning, and Contextual Standards of Correctness, Studia Semiotyczne XXXI (1), 45 -66. 2017 (download)
11. From epiphenomenalism to eliminativism? In A. Kuźniar & J. Odrowąż-Sypniewska (Eds.), Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. Uncovering facts and values : studies in contemporary epistemology and political philosophy. (pp. 192–203). Boston: Brill-Rodopi. 2016
12. Knowing Way Too Much: A Case Against Semantic Phenomenology [w:] M. Araszkiewicz et al. (eds.), Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule Following, Springer, p. 47-57, 2015
13. Douglas Edwards. Properties. Polish Journal of Philosophy, 8(1), 98-100. 2014. [Review]

Research grants:

1. Institution as believers, NCN Opus grant, Principal Investigator. (grant page)
2. A language based theory of legal interpretation, NCN Harmonia grant, led by prof. Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki from the Faculty of Law, Jagiellonian University
3. Forms of mental anti-realism, Sonata grant for young researchers, principal investigator, 2015 - 2019, National Science Center (Poland) [see more below]
4. From syntax and pragmatics to content, participant in Opus grant, led by dr Pawel Grabarczyk from Lodz University, 2015-2017.

Research visits:

1. Bednarowski fellowship at the Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, May-July 2019
2. Research visit to the Law Faculty at the University of Zagreb, part of Law-Language-Philosophy Research Network, funded by NAWA agency, April 2019.
3. Resarch visit to The Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics, funded by European Society for Philosophy of Science, April-May 2018.
4. Resarch visit to LOGOS Group, Barcelona, funded by Society-Environment-Technology program at the Jagiellonian University, January-February, 2013
5. PhD scholarship at the University of Birmingham, UK, funded by SYLFF foundation, January-August,2007

Selected conference talks:

1. Group minds and metaphysics of beliefs, The 3rd Context, Cognition and Communication Conference, Warsaw, September 2022
2. How to be fictionalist about institutional groups, Social Ontology & Collective Intentionality 2022, Vienna, August 2022
3. How to think about the debate over the reality of beliefs, 5th PLM Conference, St Andrews, August 2019
4. Group minds and metaphysics of beliefs, Social Ontology 2019, Tampere, 2019
5. A Minimalist Skeptical Solution as a Revisionary Account of Meaning, Rules, Norms, and Reasons, Milan, May 2019
6. There are only two kinds of social kinds (with Pawel Banas), Social Ontology 2018, Boston, August 2018 
7. Eliminativism, Anti-Representationalism and Carnapian Metametaphysics, ECAP 9, Munich, Germany, August 2017,
8. Expressivism, Inferentialism and the Status of Folk Psychology, The Nature of the Normative, Prague, Czech Republic, November, 2017,
9. Can Distal Reference Be Naturalized?, Fifth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics (PhiLang2017), Lodz, Poland, May 2017
10. Normativity of Meaning for Inferentialists, Why Rules Matter, Prague, Czech Republic, November 2016
11. Semantic Deflationism, Public Meaning and Contextual Standards of Correctness, The 1st Context, Cognition and Communication Conference, Warsaw, Poland, June 2016
12. Can there be expressivism about folk psychology?, Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Mind and Naturalism, Bergen, Norway, June, 2015
13. Re-reading Kripke’s Normativity Argument, Fourth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics (PhiLang2015), Lodz, Poland, May 2015
14. From Epiphenomenalism to Eliminativism?, The Polish-Scottish Philosophy Conference and Workshop, Warsaw, Poland, June 2013

Forms of mental anti-realism: grant description

The main aim of the project was to provide an comprehensive overview of anti-realist views about folk psychology. My aim was to check whether it is possible to provide a negative answer to the question whether we actually have such mental states, as many has found such a negative answer to be not feasible, if not downright incoherent. I ventured into checking the plausibility and consistency of such views as eliminative materialism, expressivism about attitudes, interpretivism, mental fictionalism and some others. The results of my project has been published in “Eliminativism: the Problem of Representation and Carnapian Metametaphysics” and in “Irrealizm a nastawienia sądzieniowe” [in Polish], with some more papers hopefully forthcoming.