I defended my PhD thesis about rule-following and semantic non-factualism in 2010. I started working as a full-time assistant professor/lecturer at the Department of Philosophy of Jagiellonian Univeristy in 2013. My main research interests from that moment focused on foundational issues in philosophy of language and on metaphysics of mind (especially the status of propositional attitudes). Currently, I have also developed interest in social ontology. From 2018 I am a member of Jagiellonian Centre for Law, Language and Philosophy.
Philosophy of mind: propositional attitudes, realism in philosophy of mind, status of folk psychology
Philosophy of language: metasemantics, normativitiy of meaning
Social ontology: social kinds, institutional entities, group minds
Papers in English:
Eliminativism: the Problem of Representation and Carnapian Metametaphysics, Acta Anaytica, doi: 0.1007/s12136-018-0369-0 (download)
Inferentialism without Normativity (with Paweł Grabarczyk), Organon F 25 (2) 2018: 174-195 (dowlnoad)
Semantic Deflationism, Public Language Meaning, and Contextual Standards of Correctness, Studia Semiotyczne XXXI (1), 45 -66. 2017 (download)
From epiphenomenalism to eliminativism? In A. Kuźniar & J. Odrowąż-Sypniewska (Eds.), Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. Uncovering facts and values : studies in contemporary epistemology and political philosophy. (pp. 192–203). Boston : Brill-Rodopi. 2016
Knowing Way Too Much: A Case Against Semantic Phenomenology [w:] M. Araszkiewicz et al. (eds.), Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule Following, Springer, p. 47-57, 2015
Douglas Edwards. Properties. Polish Journal of Philosophy, 8(1), 98-100. 2014. [Review]
Forms of mental anti-realism, Sonata grant for young researchers, principal investigator, 2015 - 2019, National Science Center (Poland) [see more below]
From syntax and pragmatics to content, participant in Opus grant, led by dr Pawel Grabarczyk from Lodz University, 2015-2017.
Bednarowski fellowship at the Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, May-July 2019
Research visit to the Law Faculty at the University of Zagreb, part of Law-Language-Philosophy Research Network, funded by NAWA agency
Resarch visit to The Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics, funded by European Society for Philosophy of Science, April-May 2018.
Resarch visit to LOGOS Group, Barcelona, funded by Society-Environment-Technology program at the Jagiellonian University, January-February, 2013
PhD scholarship at the University of Birmingham, UK, funded by SYLFF foundation, January-August,2007
Selected conference talks:
A Minimalist Skeptical Solution as a Revisionary Account of Meaning, Rules, Norms, and Reasons, Milan, May 2019
There are only two kinds of social kinds (with Pawel Banas), Social Ontology 2018, Boston, August 2018
Eliminativism, Anti-Representationalism and Carnapian Metametaphysics, ECAP 9, Munich, Germany, August 2017,
Expressivism, Inferentialism and the Status of Folk Psychology, The Nature of the Normative, Prague, Czech Republic, November, 2017,
Can Distal Reference Be Naturalized?, Fifth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics (PhiLang2017), Lodz, Poland, May 2017
Normativity of Meaning for Inferentialists, Why Rules Matter, Prague, Czech Republic, November 2016
Semantic Deflationism, Public Meaning and Contextual Standards of Correctness, The 1st Context, Cognition and Communication Conference, Warsaw, Poland, June 2016
Can there be expressivism about folk psychology?, Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Mind and Naturalism, Bergen, Norway, June, 2015
Re-reading Kripke’s Normativity Argument, Fourth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics (PhiLang2015), Lodz, Poland, May 2015
From Epiphenomenalism to Eliminativism?, The Polish-Scottish Philosophy Conference and Workshop, Warsaw, Poland, June 2013
Forms of mental anti-realism: grant description
The main aim of the project was to provide an comprehensive overview of anti-realist views about folk psychology. My aim was to check whether it is possible to provide a negative answer to the question whether we actually have such mental states, as many has found such a negative answer to be not feasible, if not downright incoherent. I ventured into checking the plausibility and consistency of such views as eliminative materialism, expressivism about attitudes, interpretivism, mental fictionalism and some others. The results of my project has been published in “Eliminativism: the Problem of Representation and Carnapian Metametaphysics” and in “Irrealizm a nastawienia sądzieniowe” [in Polish], with some more papers hopefully forthcoming.