Jagiellońskie Centrum Badawcze Prawo-Język-Filozofia wraz z Instytutem Filozofii oraz Katedrą Teorii Prawa WPiA zapraszają na wykład prof. Francesci Poggi z Uniwersytetu w Mediolanie, p.t. "Legal Positivism: Seeking for an Identity"
wykład odbędzie się we czwartek 3 października o godzinie 17.15 w sali 110 na ulicy Brackiej 12.
Beyond this fundamental disagreement, many other controversies open up. So, e.g., legal positivists disagree about the concept of legal norm, about the role of coercion within law and about the nature and role of legal interpretation.
So, what does identify legal positivism as a theory about the concept of law? Which ideas one has to adhere to in order to be considered as a legal positivist? Legal positivists have got two answers: the social source thesis and the thesis of the separation (or separability) between law and moral.
In this essay I will try to show that the social source thesis is nothing but a partial and positive version of the separation (or separability) thesis, and that the separation (or separability) thesis is not perspicuous enough to identify legal positivism as a single, well-defined, theoretical position and, therefore, it cannot distinguish legal positivism from other theories of law.