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Wykłady Jagiellońskiego Centrum Prawo-Język-Filozofia

Data: 09.10.2018 - 10.10.2018
Miejsce: sala 110, Bracka 12
Organizator: Jagiellońskie Centrum Prawo-Język-Filozofia
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Jagiellońskie Centrum Prawo-Język-Filozofia wraz z Instytutem Filozofii oraz Katedrą Teorii Prawa WPiA zapraszają na dwa wykłady dra Markus'a Kneer'a (Zurich): "Assertion, Knowledge, and Justification" oraz "Guilty Minds and Biased Minds"


W imieniu Jagiellońskiego Centrum Prawo-Język-Filozofia, Instytutu Filozofii oraz Katedry Teorii Prawa WPiA zapraszamy na dwa wykłady dr Markus'a Kneer'a z Uniwersytetu w Zurichu dotyczące eksperymentalnej filozofii prawa oraz języka. Zaproszony gość opublikował prace na temat moral luck, efektu Knobe'a, norm asercji czy debaty relatywizm-kontekstualizm:


1) 9.10.2018, godzina 17.15, sala 110, Bracka 12

Assertion, Knowledge, and Justification

Assertions are speech acts by means of which we express beliefs. As such, they are at the heart of our linguistic and social practices. Recent research has focused extensively on the question whether the speech act of assertion is governed by norms, and if so, under what conditions it is acceptable to make an assertion. Standard theories propose, for instance, that one should only assert that p if one knows that p (the knowledge account), or that one should only assert that p if p is true (the truth account). In a series of experiments, I explore this question empirically. Contrary to the philosophical orthodoxy and previous findings, knowledge turns out to be a poor predictor of assertability, and the norm of assertion is not factive either. By contrast, the data provides evidence in favour of the view that a speaker is warranted to assert that p only if her belief that p is justified.


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2) 10.10.2018, godzina 11.00, sala 110, Bracka 12

Guilty Minds and Biased Minds

According to Coke’s principle, the actus reus (the “guilty act”) and the mens rea (the “guilty state of mind”) must be treated as conceptually distinct by the law. This entails that ascriptions of inculpating states of mind should not be sensitive to certain features of the actus reus, such as the moral valence or severity of the action’s outcome. I will present data demonstrating that lay ascriptions of intentionality, knowledge and recklessness are susceptible to an outcome bias, which might put pressure on the lay jury system common in Anglophone countries. Experts, however do little better: Intentionality attributions of professional French judges manifest both the Knobe effect and the severity bias. If time allows, I’ll extend the discussion to recent findings regarding moral – and correspondingly legal – luck.


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b) załączony tekst