Interdyscyplinarne Centrum Etyki UJ (INCET) zaprasza na seminarium badawcze w ramach projektu BIOUNCERTAINTY.
Teresa Baron na Uniwersytecie w Southampton pracuje nad metafizyką ciąży, filozofią rodzicielstwa i etycznymi implikacjami nowoczesnych metod wspomagania rozrodu.
Abstract: New reproductive technologies have, in recent years, given rise to new and important questions about the ways in which family-making takes place, and the moral rights and duties of those involved in bringing children into existence. Various pathways are available to those who are unable to produce children through unassisted sexual reproduction. These include adoption, artificial insemination by husband or donor (AIH or AID), in vitro fertilisation (IVF), and surrogacy. There are two forms of surrogacy: ‘traditional’ surrogacy, in which the gestational mother is also the genetic mother of the child, and gestational surrogacy, in which the intending mother’s ovum (or an ovum from a distinct donor) is used. In the UK, at least one intending parent in a surrogacy arrangement must be genetically related to the child. However, the joint consultation report produced by the Scottish Law Commission and the Law Commission of England and Wales this year recommends that UK law be amended to allow ‘double donor’ surrogacy (DDS), in which neither intending parent is genetically related to the child. In this paper, I raise the question of what distinction, if any, can be made between DDS and planned adoption. I demonstrate that there is no morally or legally significant distinction between such arrangements, and that we must either consider both permissible or both impermissible. I then argue further, by introducing what I call 'the substitution problem,' that we should conclude the latter.